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competitive markets. However, two lines of research have been kept apart: the
homogeneous-product oligopoly approach, where entry means more firms in the
industry, and the monopolistic competition approach, where it means more brands. Our
model tries to go beyond these limitations, considering a small open economy within a
monetary union (characterised by a fixed exchange rate and perfect financial capital
mobility). In this economy each industry produces a differentiated non-tradable good
and is composed several Cournot competitors. Competition works at both the
intraindustry and sector level. Decisions on both taxes and government expenditure are
taken by the economy’s government, i.e., fiscal policy is decentralised within the
monetary union. Since the model generates multiple equilibria, three types of entry are
considered: more firms (I), more industries (II), and a combination of both (III). Fiscal
policy is shown to be effective on aggregate output under the three cases. Its effect on
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PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, FISCAL POLICY, AND FREE ENTRY
*
Luís F. Costa
In this article we extend the intertemporal general equilibrium two-sector model for a small
open economy, previously developed in Costa (1988). Product differentiation is introduced in
the non-tradable good sector, where large firms compete over quantities. The exchange rate is
fixed and financial capital is perfectly mobile. We study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal
policy considering three different types of entry: new firms per industry, new industries, and a
combination of both. A welfare analysis is also produced.
1. INTRODUCTION
ENTRY is recognised to be an important issue in macro models considering
imperfectly competitive markets. However, two lines of research have been kept apart.
The homogeneous-product oligopoly approach, where entry means more firms in the
industry, can be found in Costa (1988), and in the Cournotian Monopolistic
Competition model of Snower (1983). The monopolistic competition approach, where
it means more brands, can be found in monopolistic competition models like Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987), Dixon and Lawler (1996) , Dixon and Santoni (1995) , Heijdra
and van der Ploeg (1996) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) , Startz (1989) , and
Weitzman (1982)
1, and in the oligopoly with differentiated products model of Peretto
(1996). For surveys see Dixon and Rankin (1994) and Dixon (1994). Our model tries
to go beyond these limitations, considering a small open economy within a monetary
union (characterised by a fixed exchange rate and perfect financial capital mobility). In
this economy each industry produces a differentiated non-tradable good and is
composed several Cournot competitors. Competition works at both the intra-industry
and sector level. The size of non-tradable goods producers is assumed to be large also
at the economy level and Ford effects are considered as in d'Aspremont et al. (1989).
In addition, fiscal policy is decentralised within the monetary union, i.e., decisions on
taxes and government expenditure are taken at the economy’s level, and labour
markets are competitive.
Since the model generates multiple equilibria, three types of entry are considered:
more firms (I), more industries (II), and a combination of both (III). In case I, we
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study the effects of fiscal policy when entry implies more firms per industry and a
constant number of industries, as in the homogeneous-product oligopoly approach. In
case II, entry means a change in the number of non-tradable goods, but not in the
number of firms per industry, as in the monopolistic competition approach. Finally, in
case III, we assume a special case of a simultaneous change of both numbers. In
section 2, we derive the microeconomic foundations of the model. In section 3, we
generate a benchmark initial steady state and we do a comparative statics analysis of
small deviations in initial conditions for the three cases considered. In section 4, we
briefly study the short-run features of the model. In section 5, we investigate the long-
run effects of either temporary and permanent fiscal shocks, under the three types of
entry. Finally, in section 6, we assess fiscal policy through household’s intertemporal
utility. Fiscal policy is shown to be effective on aggregate output under the three cases.
Its effect on welfare is mainly walrasian in case II, but it can be keynesian when market
power is high in cases I or III. Therefore, pure waste government spending can be used
to increase households’ welfare when the economy is in one considerably inefficient
steady state and profits are likely to induce the entry of more firms in the existing non-
tradable goods industries.
2. MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
There are two types of goods produced: a homogeneous tradable and n brands of
non-tradable good. The economy is small, so that the price of the tradable good is set
in the international market. Labour is the only input and is sector specific. We refer to
each type as ‘tradable’ and ‘non-tradable’ labour. Both labour markets are competitive.
Government expenditure is pure waste, and is made in a basket of both types of goods.
Lump sum taxes and seignorage are used to finance it. There is only an international
bond, the exchange rate follows a flat shock-free path over time, financial capital is
perfectly mobile, and labour internationally immobile.
2.1. Household behaviour
The representative household maximises an additive intertemporal utility function
over an infinite lifetime horizon
max . . .
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where 0 < b < 1 is the discount factor, Ct is an aggregate consumption index, Nt
s the
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3
real money balances at the end of period t.
2 Also we suppose e > 0, g £ 0,
3 c, x ³ 0,
and m > 1. The consumption index, Ct, is Cobb-Douglas and homogenous of degree
one (HoDO)
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where Ct
T is the consumption of tradable good, and Ct
NT is a CES basket of n non-
tradable goods consumption, where there is no love for variety
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4. The budget constraint is given by
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where it is the nominal interest rate paid on bonds held until the end of period t, Ft the
real domestic net foreign assets holdings, Mt the money holdings, wt
e (e = T, NT) the
wage rates for type s labour, Pt the profit income, pt
T is the price of the tradable good
in domestic currency,  pjt
NT
,  (j = 1,..., n) is the price of type j non-tradable good, and tt
h
a real lump-sum tax. The appropriate cost of living index, Pt, is given by
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where i = a
-a.(1-a)
a-1 and pt
NT is the appropriate non-tradable good price index.
The household optimal decision in terms of consumption is made in three stages.
First, it decides the consumption levels of aggregate consumption good, leisure and
real money balances. Second, it decides the optimal composition of aggregate
consumption between tradable and non-tradable good. Finally, it determines the
                                               
2 All stocks are measured at the end of the period denoted.
3  We exclude the range (0,1] from the domain of g. This implies an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution smaller or equal than one. Since empirical evidence suggests this elasticity to be small,
and numerical experiments for positive values of g do not generate significant differences, we use this
simplified version. For more details see Costa (1988).
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optimal composition of the non-tradable good index. The household is a price taker in
labour and financial markets, and has no influence on the firm’s decisions. We can
summarise its behaviour with the following set of equations
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(j = 1, ..., n) c
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Equation (6.) is the aggregate consumption Euler equation. Equations (7.) and (8.)
are the tradable and non-tradable good demands. (9.)represents the labour supplies.
Equation (10.) represents real money balances demand. Finally, (11.) gives us the
demand for each brand of non-tradable good. Additionally, we have to consider the
transversality condition for non-human wealth.
2.2. The tradable good sector
The representative firm in this sector maximises the present value of its real profits
max .
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where 0 < f £ 1 implies non-increasing returns to scale. Considering the firm is a price
taker in the tradable good, ‘tradable’ labour, and financial markets, we have a static
optimisation problem with the following first order conditions
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Equation (14.) gives us the domestic supply for tradable good. Equation (15.) is the
‘tradable’ labour demand.
2.3. The government
Government purchases both types of goods with the same preferences as the
household.  Its aggregate consumption, Gt gives no utility to the household, and does
not affect firms’ productivity. Government expenditure is financed levying a real lump
sum tax on the household, tt
h, and a lump-sum corporate tax on each firm in the non-
tradable good sector, tt
NT. Since we have m firms in each one of the n non-tradable
good industries, total real tax revenues are given by tt  = tt
h  +  m.n.tt
NT. Also,
seignorage is a source of income. Considering we have a representative infinite living
household, ricardian equivalence holds in this model. Therefore, there is no lost in
ignoring government borrowing. Also, we assume the government/central bank is
responsible for keeping the exchange rate level, and commits itself to a time-invariant
net foreign assets stock. Thus, the budget constraint is Gt = tt + DMt/Pt, and demand
functions are similar to (7.) and (8.).
2.4. The non-tradable good sector
In this sector, firms 1 to m produce the brand 1, firms m+1 to 2.m produce the
brand 2 and so forth. Hence, firms (j-1).m+1 to j.m are the producers of good j (j = 1,
..., n). Firm iÎ j={(j-1).m+1, ..., j.m}
5 maximises its present discounted value of real
profits
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where  qit
NT
,  is its output, and Nit
NT
,  is ‘non-tradable’ labour input. The firm is a price
taker in the relevant labour market. The lump-sum corporate tax is the source of a
fixed cost as we can find either in Costa (1988) and Snower (1983)
6. We assume the
following technology
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,, . =1 (17.)
Firm i competes over quantities assuming other firms’ actions (productions), within
the industry, are given to itself. However, since each type of non-tradable good is an
imperfect substitute of the others, competition goes beyond the intra-industry level and
exists at the inter-industry level as well. We assume firm i takes prices in other
industries as given. Consequently, we presuppose a market structure that does not
correspond to the traditional Cournot oligopoly. We will call it Cournotian
Oligopolistic Competition. Each firm competes for the residual demand existing for its
type of good, at the industry level, and, simultaneously, for the residual demand for all
non-tradable goods, at the sector level. If we consider the limit of this structure when n
tends to infinity, we have Cournotian Monopolistic Competition, using the
classification of the general equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition in
d'Aspremont et al. (1997). In Table 1 we present some special cases of market
structures for the non-tradable good sector, arising from the framework we described.
Using our framework, the model shown in Costa (1988) can be viewed as a special
case of the present one when we consider n, the number of industries in the sector, to
be equal to one. In the same way, models considering monopolistic competition in the
non-tradable good sector can be considered a limit case of this model when m, the
number of firms per industry, is one and n is large. The walrasian case is also a limit
case when we consider m to be large, whatever the number of industries in the sector
7.
[INSERT Table 1 HERE]
 Looking at another dimension of the problem, the size of the non-tradable good
sector in the economy is an important issue to define firms’ behaviour. If 1-a, which is
a measure of the sector’s importance in the economy, is significantly different from
zero, both the aggregate consumption and price index cannot be seen as exogenous
variables by the individual producer. As in Costa (1988), we follow d'Aspremont et al.
(1989) when we assume there are Ford effects on these two aggregate variables to be
considered at the microeconomic level. Let us analyse the behaviour of firm i in
                                               
6 We discuss the reason for this choice in detail in the first of these papers.
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industry j. The objective market demand clearing the market for non-tradable good j,
given equations (8.), (11.) and their homologous for government, corresponds to the
following pair of equations
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,,, =+ is the total demand for non-tradable good of type j,  gjt
NT
,  is
government demand for the same type, Dt
NT = Ct
NT  +  Gt
NT  is total demand for
composite non-tradable good, Gt
NT is the government non-tradable good consumption
index, and Qt = Ct + Gt is total domestic demand for aggregate consumption good.
We now assume a symmetric equilibrium to hold in each market for a non-tradable
good type. Therefore, in market j every firm must produce the same quantity and,
consequently, posts the same price qqi h it
NT
ht
NT
j , , , =" ¹ Î . Given identical technologies
and demands, it is easy to see symmetry holds across non-tradable goods’ markets as
well. Firm i’s maximisation program is constituted by equations (2.) and (3.), and their
correspondent definitions for government, giving us the Ford effects via aggregate
consumption;  (5.) which take into account the Ford effects through the aggregate price
level; (16.), defining the objective function; (17.), the production function; (18.)the
market demand for this type of good; and the symmetry conditions due to identical
preferences between the household and government cC gG jt
NT
t
NT
jt
NT
t
NT
,, // =  and
CC GG t
NT
tt
NT
t // = . Assuming the firm takes the real interest rate as given, the
intertemporal  maximisation problem coincides with a static one, and the corresponding
first order conditions under a symmetric equilibrium, are given by equations (19.) and
(20.). We supposed the pure non-co-operative equilibrium to be the one to hold, since
we face a multiple equilibria problem arising from the Folk theorem.
The price setting condition is given by
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where ni,t is the reciprocal of demand elasticity faced by this firm. Likewise, hi,t is the
elasticity giving us the proportional change in the aggregate price level when firm i
increases its production by one percent, assuming the other firms to maintain the same
production level,  i.e., h¶ ¶ it t it
NT
it
NT
t Pq q P ,, , /. / =ch c h . Under the symmetric equilibrium
assumption,  ni,t = -1/(s.m) and hi,t = -(1-a)/(s.m). First, we can easily see the limit of
price-wage ratio when s tends to one, i.e., when non-tradable goods tend to be perfect
substitutes, corresponds to the ratio obtained in Costa (1988). Second, since the price-8L UÍS F. COSTA
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wage ratio depends negatively on s, for the same values of a and m, product
differentiation reduces the market power of the individual firm. The economic intuition
lies on the competition with firms in other industries and not only within the same
industry
8. The other first order condition gives us firm i’s labour demand driven by the
need to clear demand in its market for the price it sets
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,, . =1 (20.)
We assume the number of firms per industry, m, and the number of industries in the
sector, n, cannot change immediately, due to the existence of a one-period lag to set-
up or close down an existing firm. However, when we impose a zero profit condition
in the steady state, we face another multiple equilibria problem. The partial equilibrium
in the market for good j implies a reduced form for firm i’s real (static) profits which is
of type pt a s it
NT
t
T
t
T
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NT mnD p w , ,, , , , ,, = ch , and Dt
T = Ct
T+ Gt
T. Firm i’s profit
function is decreasing on both n and m, as we would expect. Given the values for the
parameters and the exogenous variables, and for the same n, an increase in m decreases
both the market power and, under a symmetric equilibrium, the average market
demand for this type of good. We can observe this relationship through the following
partial derivative
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a-1/n > 0, g(m,.) is the price-wage ratio and m³2.
Considering the same m, an increase in n, under a symmetric equilibrium, decreases the
average demand for each industry and, therefore, the profits of each firm, as we can
see using
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Let us imagine we departure from a zero profit situation. Then an unanticipated
shock hits firm i, generating positive profits for the initial values of n and m. The
situation before the shock is represented by point A in Fig. 1. Any point on the BCD
schedule is a zero profit equilibrium. We are going to consider three cases: (i) in case I,
                                               
8 If we consider the Lerner index, m
L
i,t, as a more appropriate measure of market power, we reach the
same conclusion as we observe that
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the number of industries is fixed and entry means more firms in each industry. This
corresponds to the shift from A to D. Notice the model in Costa (1988) uses the
expression ‘free entry’ in this sense and for the special case when n = 1; (ii) in case II,
the number of firms per industry is fixed and entry means more brands in the non-
tradable good sector. This corresponds to the shift from A to B. A model of
monopolistic competition would be a special case when m = 1; (iii) in case III, we
assume n = k.m and, consequently, entry means more firms per industry and more
industries as well. Of course there would be much more cases to deal with, including
the consideration of the limit case of monopoly, the upper limit for profits and
represented by point M, but we think these three cases are sufficient to give us an
extensive cover of the most interesting cases occurring in real economies.
[INSERT Fig. 1 HERE]
Equilibrium in the ‘non-tradable’ labour market is given by the market clearing
condition equalising supply, which is described by (9.)b, and its demand given by
NN t
NT
it
NT
ij m
jm
j
n
=
=- + = å å ,
.
.
11 1 af
(21.)
3. A BENCHMARK INITIAL STEADY STATE
3.1. Finding a closed form solution to the model
At the macroeconomic level, we can define an aggregate output concept as
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We suppose the rest of the world supplies or purchases any quantity of the tradable
good at the current price level. Net exports, Xt, are the difference between domestic
supply and demand for the tradable good  Xq D tt
T
t
T =-, and an aggregate budget
constraint for domestic agents, adding up individual constraints is given by
CGYrF F tt t tt t += + - -- 11 . D  (23.)
9
where Ft=Bt/Pt represents real net foreign assets held by the household. In the steady
state we rule out unlimited Ponzi borrowing schemes considering the intertemporal
budget constraint which follows from (23.)
                                               
9  For sake of simplicity, we assume the representative household’s share on foreign firms to be zero.10 LUÍS F. COSTA
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CGYr F
** * * * . +=+ (24.)
where variables with asterisks represent their steady state equilibrium values. We
assume the necessary condition for a zero growth steady state in a small open economy
with perfect capital mobility holds, i
*=r
*=(1-b)/b, where the interest rate as to be equal
to domestic household rate of time preference. As in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),
Sutherland (1996) , and Costa (1988), we assume G
* = F
* = 0, in order to obtain a
closed form solution to the steady state model. The correspondent steady state path
will be our benchmark
10. When we consider either n to be exogenous or to be
proportional to m, we can reduce the steady state system to a two-equation system
with two variables to be determined, C and m, for convenience. In both cases (I and
III), we cannot obtain a closed form solution for the whole system and, consequently,
we have to obtain m through numerical methods. When we consider m to be an
exogenous variable (case II), we obtain a closed form solution for the reduced model
determining C and, in this case, n. For the benchmark steady state we derive a solution
for C given m and n which, in any of the three cases considered, will be determined
jointly by this equation and the zero profit condition. Steady state real aggregate
consumption is thus given by
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where f(m) = (1-a+s.m)/[(1-a).(s.m-a)] and r = m-g.[1-a.(1-f)] > 0. The aggregate
consumption (and output) level in this equilibrium is greater than when we consider a
single homogeneous non-tradable good, given the same value for m. The reason lies on
the  effect of product differentiation on the market power of the individual firm,
reducing it and, therefore, reducing the imperfect competition inefficiency level in the
economy. We can easily demonstrate that considering
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Finally, using (25.) in the zero profit condition
                                               
10 The balance budget constraint and our assumption of an exogenous fiscal policy imply the positive
tax revenue from the non-tradable good sector has to be offset by benefits granted to the household so
that n.m.t
NT = -t
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Let us compare the benchmark steady state levels for some of the variables (e.g.
aggregate consumption) with the one in Costa (1988). In that case, we use the same
set of parameter values, except for s, which has to be greater than one with product
differentiation. The difference between the two situations lies in the value for f(.).
Since C
* is decreasing in f(.) , and f(.) is decreasing in s.m, it is easy to see that: (i) if s
<  mH/m, where mH is the number of non-tradable good firms considering a
homogeneous non-tradable good
12, the benchmark steady state level for aggregate
consumption would be lower under imperfect substitutability; (ii) if s = mH/m the
benchmark steady state level for aggregate consumption would be the same in both
models; (iii) if s > mH/m the benchmark steady state level for aggregate consumption
would be higher under imperfect substitutability. Notice that mH/m > 1, given the slope
of the isoprofit schedule in the (m, n) space, and m can be endogenous (cases I and III)
or exogenous (case II), in the model with product differentiation. Therefore, none of
these cases can be ruled out a priori.
3.1.2. Comparing different initial steady states
The first step in the analysis of the general equilibrium in this economy consists on a
comparative statics investigation of a log-linear version of the model. We look upon
the effects of slightly different initial conditions on the general equilibrium set. We use
the  values obtained for the benchmark steady state and the relevant behavioural
equations, to derive a log-linearised version of the system around that particular
equilibrium point. However, as we demonstrated before, general equilibrium depends
on the assumptions we make about entry in the non-tradable good sector. Therefore,
we have to consider three different log-linearised models corresponding to the cases
we proposed to study. Variables with hats represent its long-run percentage deviation
from the benchmark steady state and can be defined as  $ /
** * Hd H H = . An exception
has to be made for  $ * G  and  $* F  because its equilibrium values in the benchmark steady
state were set to zero. Therefore, we define its permanent log-deviations with respect
to the consumption of composite good  $ /
** * Gd G C =   and   $ /
** * Fd F C = . The system
of equations we obtain is the following, assuming  $
*
p
T = 0
$ . $$ ** * QF Y =
-
+
1 b
b
(27.)
                                               
11  The value for qi
NT* can easily be obtained using C
*.
12  The number is given by the limit of m when s tends to unity.12 LUÍS F. COSTA
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The values for the new parameters, considering m ³ 2, are given by b1 = (s.m-
a)/(2.s.m- a), 1/3 £ b1 £ 1/2, b2 = s.m/[(s.m- a).(1+s.m- a)], 0 < b2 £ 1, k1 =
b1/(1+b1) and b3 = m.[1-a.(1-f)]-(1-a).f > 0. We can compare these parameters with
their homologous from Costa (1988), for the same values of m and a, which are given
by the limit when s tends to unity a bb 1 1 11 =>
® lim
s   and  a bb 2 1 22 =<
® lim
s  (m = mH)
13.
To obtain the previous steady-state system, first we substitute all the industry and
sector variables, excepting m and n, leaving only the macroeconomic relevant
variables. Equation (27.) is the log-linear form of (24.). Equation (28.), arises from (5.)
and from the reduced form for  $
*
p
NT . We obtain (30.) using the zero profit condition in
(26.), and (31.) is the log-linear version of (22.). We use the following notation for
static multipliers
s Hh
G
F
H
h
,
*
* $
$
$
$ *
*
=
=
=
0
0
 , s HG F
n
m
nm
H
G
,
*
*
$
$
$
$$
$
$
*
*
*
**
= =
=Ü
=Ü
=Ü
R
S |
T |
0
0
0
case I
case II
case III
 and s HF G
n
m
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H
F
,
*
*
$
$
$
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*
*
*
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= =
=Ü
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=Ü
R
S |
T |
0
0
0
case I
case II
case III
for h = n (case I), m (case II). Table 2 show us the static multipliers for H = Y, C, m
and P, and where
v
bb
kb
s =
Ü
Ü
Ü
R
S |
T |
12
12
.
.
case I
0 case II
case III
   and D
D
D
ss s vv =- -- =
Ü
Ü
Ü
R
S |
T |
11
1
bgaf .. ra r
case I
case II
case III 3
[INSERT  Table 2 HERE]
                                               
13  If we want to generate benchmark initial steady states where the number of firms per industry is the
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The determinant of the system, Ds, is positive, and it is easy to observe that r > D3 >
D1 > D = lim
s® 1 1 D .
14
3.1.3. Case I: n is exogenous
Here we consider entry affects the number of firms per industry, but not the number
of non-tradable good industries, which we assume to be exogenously determined. This
version of equation (30.) determines  $
* m  given  $
* n . First, let us study the effects of
considering a larger number of non-tradable good types in the economy. The obvious
effect of a greater value for n is the consequent reduction in the value for m under a
zero profit equilibrium. The static multiplier is sm,n=-r.b1/D1<0. The immediate
consequence of the smaller m is a higher market power for each firm. Thus, the
aggregate production of (composite) non-tradable good is smaller and is sold at a
higher price, inducing a higher aggregate price index, i.e., sP,n=(1-a).(m-
g.f).b1.b2/(m.D1)³0. Even considering effect on the tradable good equilibrium
production is positive, we obtain a negative effect on aggregate output and
consumption arising from the larger inefficiency level in the economy: sY,n=sC,n=-(1-
a).b1.b2/D1£0.
Second, let us now analyse the effect on the initial steady state values of marginally
different level of government expenditure. Considering another initial steady state
where the non-tradable good is homogeneous, i.e., s tends to one, and the fixed cost,
tH
NT, is such that mH, the number of firms in the sector, is equal to m.s, the values from
the benchmark steady state with differentiated products. In this special case, the price-
wage ratio is the same in both models and, consequently, all variables present the same
initial  values. Furthermore, the parameter values in the log-linearised steady state
model are the same since a1 = b1 and a2 = b2. Therefore, the model with a single
homogeneous non-tradable good produces exactly the same outcome as the one we
present here. However, we also want to compare the static multipliers in this model
with the one in Costa (1988) when the set of parameter values is the same, of course
excepting s and n. We know a smaller value for m is generated, i.e., m<mH and s>1.
Unfortunately, b1 and b2 depend on s.m which can be smaller, equal or greater than
mH. Therefore, anything is possible in terms of ranking the static multipliers in both
                                               
14  It is easy to demonstrate that D1 is greater than D, for m=mH, the determinant of the system matrix
in Costa (1988). The main step to consider is to recognise that
¶
¶s
sa a
sa a s
bb m m
mm
12
22
22
21
21
0
.. . . .
.. . .
()
=-
+-
-- +
<
()
() ( )
and, therefore, b1.b2 < a1.a2. We showed in the above-mentioned article it is impossible for D to be
non-positive, given g £ 0.14 LUÍS F. COSTA
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cases. A larger government expenditure level would have a positive impact on the
profits in the non-tradable good sector and, therefore, would generate a larger initial
m. Considering the effect on aggregate consumption is sC,G = sY,G - 1, it is not possible
to rule out either crowding out or crowding in of private consumption due to a larger
initial government consumption level. Given the effect on output and market power,
and the particular structure of the labour market, the negative multiplier for aggregate
prices is replicated in this model.
Third, we have to analyse the effect of a different initial endowment of net foreign
assets. A positive initial level of net foreign assets, of one per cent of aggregate
consumption, is an extra source of income for the household. Therefore, considering
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than unity, the household is willing to
supply less labour of both types and aggregate output is lower. This is due to the effect
on aggregate consumption
15. A higher level of wealth induces a bigger consumption
level and, consequently, a negative effect on labour supplies. The effect on m and on
the aggregate price index is positive.
3.1.4. Case II: m is exogenous
In this case we assume entry affects the number of non-tradable goods in the
economy, and therefore the number of industries in the Cournot sector, but not the
number of firms existing in each industry, which we assume to be determined
exogenously. The steady state log-linearised system remains the same, but equation
(30.) has now a different interpretation, when we take into account $
* n  is the
endogenous  variable in the zero profit condition and  $
* m , entering (28.) as well, is not
determined in the system. First, let us study the effect of a larger m in the initial steady
state. The consequence of this change in initial conditions on n is given by sn,m=-
[r.(1-b1.b2)+a.b1.b2]/(r.b1)<0.  The static multiplier is different from -1/b1 since m
influences market power and, therefore, price and output in the non-tradable good
sector. Given the lower market power, aggregate output and consumption are higher
as the multipliers show sY,m=sC,m=(1-a).b2]/r³0. The aggregate price index is lower
due to the indirect effect through price-wage ratio: sP,m=-(1-a).(m-g.f).b2/(m.r)£0.
Second, we study the effects of a different initial fiscal policy in the initial steady state.
A higher value for G
* stimulates profits and, therefore, induces entry in the non-
tradable good sector. Entry means, in this case, a larger n:  sn,G=(1-g).[1-a.(1-
                                               
15We expect this multiplier to be non-positive for g £ 0 and for a plausible set of values for the other
parameters. The relevant constraint implies that the increase in the household’s steady state aggregate
consumption cannot exceed the (new) real interest income. Notice that this restriction is somehow
equivalent to impose a marginal propensity to consume less or equal than unity. For more details, see
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f)]/r³0.  However,  since  the price-wage ratio is not affected by changes in n,
deviations from the benchmark initial steady state attributable to a distinct fiscal policy,
are not affected by product differentiation and its relevant static multipliers correspond
to their homologous in the homogeneous good model, when we rule out entry. Third,
a higher initial level of net foreign assets would induce more firms to be in the sector,
which  would  mean  more types of non-tradable good: sn,F=(1-b).(m-f)]/(b.r)³0.
Again, the other static multipliers remain indifferent to the introduction of non-tradable
good brands.
3.1.5. Case III: n/m is exogenous
When we analyse the last of the three cases considered, entry in the non-tradable
good sector means, simultaneously, a change in the number of firms per industry and in
the number of industries. We assume both numbers move together according to a
proportional relation where n = k.m, k > 0. Therefore, we add an extra independent
equation to the steady state system, allowing us to determine both numbers as
endogenous variables. This fact alters the form of equation (30.) in the log-linearised
system. First, when we consider the initial steady state changes arising from a different
initial fiscal policy. The static multipliers are similar to those presented in case I, even if
they show different values. Notice, in this case, the entry incentive has to be shared
between firms and industries.  Second, a higher initial level of net foreign assets still
has positive effects on m, aggregate consumption and prices. Again, the effect on
aggregate output is negative.
3.1.6. Comparing the three cases
Finally, let us compare the values for the static multipliers amongst the three cases
considered and with the findings in Costa (1988). A different initial fiscal policy as
differentiated impacts on the key endogenous variables. Multipliers are sorted in Table
3. We obtain a clear pattern for the effects of a larger government expenditure on these
variables, where we can conclude the sensitivity of these static multipliers decreases
when the importance of the number of industries in the free entry process increases
(and the importance of the number of firm per industry decreases). The same pattern is
observed for the static net foreign assets multipliers for the aggregate consumption,
aggregate price index and the number of firms per industry. This also applies
unambiguously to aggregate output.
[INSERT Table 3 HERE]16 LUÍS F. COSTA
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4. SHORT-RUN ANALYSIS
If an unexpected shock occurs, both n and m remain unchanged during that period,
i.e., entry can only happen in the following one. Log-linearising the short-run system
around the benchmark steady state path we obtain a set of equations very similar to
(27.) to (31.). Assuming both the nominal interest rate and the price of the tradable
good remain at their benchmark steady-state values, we obtain
$ . $$ $ FF Y Q tt t t =+ - -
1
1 b
(32.)
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where variables with hats represent its short-run percentage deviation from the
benchmark steady state path, and are defined as  $ /
* Hd H H tt = . Again,  $ Gt  and  $ Ft  are
defined respectively as dG C t /
* and dF C t /
*. Equation (32.) is the log-linear version
of (23.), and highlights the fact that Ft is an endogenous variable in the short-run
system. Equation (34.) is identical to (29.), but defines Qt, the domestic aggregate
demand, instead of Ct, which is now given by (35.), the log-linear version of (6.), the
Euler equation. Equations (33.) and (37.) are similar to (28.) and (31.). Finally,
equation (36.), reflects the dynamic pattern of entry. As in Costa (1988), Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995) and Sutherland (1996), inter alia, the presence of a unit root in this type
of models is inevitable. However, we restrict our analysis to either unanticipated one-
period temporary or permanent fiscal shocks, i.e., log-deviations from the benchmark
steady state path for Gt are of type  $ Gt =1 for t = 1,  $ Gt = 0 for t ³ 2 and the shock isPRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, FISCAL POLICY, AND FREE ENTRY 17
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temporary (Temp), and  $ Gt =1, for t  ³ 1 and the shock is permanent (Perm).
Furthermore, $ nt = 0 in case I,  $ mt = 0 in case II, and $$ nm tt =  in case III. Assuming the
economy is on its benchmark steady state in t = 0, we can concentrate the dynamic
features of the model in t = 1, and a new steady sate is reached no later than t = 2.
Therefore, we can ignore time subscripts for the short-run variables. The solution to
net foreign assets log-deviation is given by  $ $$$$ * FF Y C G ==--. We can compute a
closed form solution to this value, given our assumptions about the shocks, equations
(27.) to (31.), (32.) to (37.), and the transversality condition for the household wealth
$ . $ * FR R G =- + 01 (38.)
where  R0 and R1 are both non-negative. We present the expressions for these
parameters in Appendix A. The following features can be observed: (i)
$| $| $| FFF Case II Case III Case I ££ £ 0 for a temporary shock ( $ * G = 0), (ii)
$| $| $| FF F Case I Case III Case II ££= 0 for a permanent shock ( $ * G =1), and, since R1 is non-
negative, $| F Case I for a permanent shock is always greater or equal than its value for a
temporary shock. See Appendix B for proof.
5. LONG-RUN ANALYSIS
5.1. A temporary fiscal shock
From the solution of the short-run model we know an unexpected one per cent
increase in government consumption generates a permanent foreign debt situation, i.e.,
$$ * FF R == - £ 0 0. Since we assume no further shocks will happen in period t = 2, the
long-run effect on the endogenous variable  $ * H  is due only to the ‘surprise effect’ and,
consequently, we have  $ . $ *
,
* HF HF =s . Thus, a temporary positive fiscal shock
increases  output,  decreases consumption and prices in period t = 2, for the three cases
considered. When we allow m to change, the negative wealth effect implies negative
profits in the Cournot sector and the zero profit condition induces a decrease in m and,
as a result, an increase in her market power. The new long-run equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by the initial one.
5.2. A permanent fiscal shock
A permanent fiscal shock has differentiated effects on the value of the state variable,
net foreign assets, in the three cases considered. In case II, R0 = R1 and, therefore,
$ F= 0. Moreover, the macroeconomic variables jump to their new long-run equilibrium
in period t = 1.
16 When we consider g = 0, we also obtain  $ F= 0, in all the three cases.
                                               
16  The non-tradable good industry variables are affected in period t = 2 by the new value of n.18 LUÍS F. COSTA
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The particular value assumed for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (one)
equals  the  elasticity of intratemporal substitution between tradables and non-tradables,
which implies additional effort in period t = 1, in order to smooth the consumption
path
17.
The effect of a one per cent permanent increase in government consumption on m is
given by  $ . $ *
,,
* mF mG mF =+ ss . However, since both multipliers are positive, we face
two opposite effects on m: (i) the permanent fiscal expansion has a direct effect
increasing profits and inducing new firms to enter each market, and (ii) the permanent
reduction on the net foreign assets level reduces profits and induces firms to leave. We
can compute the reduced form for the steady-state change in m
$ . $ ** mu C s =- 1 di    where   u
bs
s
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R
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T |
11
13
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D
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II
III
Even if we cannot demonstrate  $* C >-1 holds in general, we expect it to hold for
plausible values of the parameters
18. Thus, under this assumption, fiscal policy has a
positive impact on m in cases I and III and, no impact in case II. Furthermore, it is
clear-cut that  $$ $
** * mm m Case I Case III Case II >>= 0. Now, it is easy to analyse the impact of
fiscal policy on the other variables since we can separate the effect of entry from the
no-entry effect. Therefore, the impact of a permanent fiscal shock on the aggregate
output is given by  $ . $ *
,,
* YF YG YF =+ ss  which is equivalent to
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where zs = b2 in cases I and III, and zs = 0 in case II. Since the first term in the right-
hand side of the equation does not depend on the type of entry considered, we can
concentrate on the second and third terms. Thus, in case II, the effect of a permanent
one per cent increase in government expenditure is given by the first term alone. The
rank for the second term is case I, case III and case II (zero), according to the order of
the change in net foreign assets. In cases I and III, (1-a).b2/r is the same, but more
firms per industry enter the non-tradable goods markets in the first one. Therefore, we
can conclude that, given the assumptions made,  $ | $ | $ |
** * YY Y Case I Case III Case II >>³ 0.
                                               
17 See Costa (1988) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) pp. 232-235 for more details.
18 Numerical experiments, even considering extreme values for the parameters, where not able to
generate an equilibrium where 
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The third variable to study is aggregate consumption. Using equation (27.), we can
observe the effect of a one per cent permanent increase in government consumption.
When we allow m to vary (cases I and III), we have to consider two effects: (i) output
is bigger and, as a consequence, consumption tends to be higher; (ii) net debt is also
larger, opposing the previous effect. Therefore, we cannot unambiguously rank this
variable for the three cases
19. Finally, we analyse the effect on the aggregate price
index. As we did for the aggregate output, we can obtain a reduced form for this
effect, given by
$ ..
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Even if entry means more industries and not more firms per industry in the non-
tradable goods sector (case II), a permanent fiscal shock reduces permanently the
aggregate price level. When we allow m to vary, the market power decreases and so
does the level of net foreign assets, introducing extra sources of price reduction.
Therefore, we notice that  $ | $ | $ |
** * PP P Case I Case III Case II <<£ 0.
                                               
19  Also, we cannot guarantee the effect will be non-negative.
6. WELFARE ANALYSIS
6.1. Utility flows
We know, from Costa (1988), utility decreases in the short run due to the decrease
in consumption and in both types of leisure. Also, we know a temporary fiscal shock
reduces the household’s steady state utility flow due to the permanent reduction in the
net foreign asset level, which induces a steady state aggregate consumption and both
types of leisure decrease. Considering entry of firms in each non-tradable good
industry, worsens the situation since firms tend to leave their market in this situation
(cases I and III). When we consider a permanent fiscal shock, the steady state utility
level may improve if two conditions hold: the aggregate output static fiscal multiplier is
bigger than one, i.e., we observe crowding-in in consumption, and the increase in
utility due to a consumption (and real money balances) increase is large enough to
compensate the reduction generated by the increase in working time. The change in the
steady state utility level is given by20 LUÍS F. COSTA
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The expressions for uC = C
*g+c.(1-g)/x.(M
*/P
*), uNT = x.N
T* and uNNT = x.N
NT*, are all
positive. When entry does not affect m, case II, is easy to see the effect of a permanent
fiscal shock on the utility is unambiguously negative. However, in cases I and III, the
reduction on the price-wage ratio, created by entry of new firms in each industry,
produces a positive impact on utility which may increase the steady state utility flow.
6.2. Intertemporal utility
When we consider the stream of discounted utility flows, we know the difference
between the three cases considered lies on the steady state utility level. Therefore, the
rank for welfare is the same as for the steady state utility flows, i.e., only cases I and
III can generate a positive change. A third necessary condition for fiscal policy to
improve welfare is needed: the discounted gains in the steady state flow have to
overrun the short-run lost of utility. This condition is, like Costa (1988), equivalent to
dU
* >-(1-b)/b.dU, where dU is the change in the utility in period t = 1.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we present a dynamic general equilibrium two-sector model for a small
open economy considering product differentiation in the non-tradable good sector.
Considering imperfect substitution between the several types of non-tradable good
allow us to nest in a single framework the models of monopolistic competition in the
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) tradition, and those involving homogeneous products
oligopolies following d'Aspremont et al. (1989), as in the case of Costa (1988). We
noticed that entry is a much more complex issue when it may mean changes in the
number of industries (n), changes in the number of firms per industry (m) or a
combination of both. The presence of product differentiation implies a multiple
equilibria problem due to the trade-off between the two above-mentioned numbers in
the zero profit condition.
In the long-run, we study the effects of fiscal policy considering three cases of
entry: case I where n is fixed, case II where m is fixed, and case III where n/m is fixed.PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, FISCAL POLICY, AND FREE ENTRY 21
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The outcomes of case I are similar to those of Costa (1988) when there is entry. Case
II is also similar to the above-mentioned model, but considering entry is absent. The
third case lies in between. This result depends strongly on the assumption that the
household has no love for variety. Therefore, fiscal policy is more effective, under
plausible assumptions, when entry means more firms per industry than when it means
more brands. This applies for aggregate output and price index and, under particular
assumptions, for household consumption and welfare as well. It is possible for the
government to improve welfare using fiscal policy in cases I and III, but not in case II.
Once again the assumption about love for variety is crucial. The subset of the
parameters’ space for which a welfare improvement happens when there is a different
fiscal policy is more restricted in case III since part of the entry stimulus is directed to
change the number of non-tradable good industries.
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APPENDIX A
The reduced form for the parameters giving us  $$ * FF =  are R0 ³ R1
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where DS ss ss s v =+ QD ..  is assumed to be positive. The new parameters are given by
Qss s vv =- - - ja .. 11 bg af   ,  jm ga g m =-- - > af af .. 1 0   ,  Ss s ss v =- 12 . s = I, II, III
s1 11 =+ - + - - ra j a g a b m f af a fa f .. . . .  , s2 11 0 =+ - + -> ra ja af af .TITLE OF ARTICLE 23
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The complexity for the expression of Ds does not allow us to demonstrate it is
always positive. However, numerical experiments for plausible values of the
parameters did not generate an equilibrium able to produce Ds £ 0.
APPENDIX B
For temporary fiscal shocks, we know  $ F £ 0, therefore:
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For permanent fiscal shocks, we know  $| F Case II = 0, therefore:
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TABLE 1
TYPOLOGY OF MARKET STRUCTURES FOR THE NON-TRADABLE GOOD SECTOR
n ®
 m ¯
One Few Many
One Monopoly
 a Bertrand Oligopoly with
Differentiated Goods
 a
Monopolistic
Competition
Few Cournot Oligopoly with
One Homogeneous Good
 a
Cournotian Oligopolistic
Competition
 a
Cournotian Monopolistic
Competition
Many Perfect Competition Perfect Competition Perfect Competition
a If the sector is large in the economy, there are Ford effects which have to be considered.
TABLE 2
STEADY STATE STATIC MULTIPLIERS
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a For s = cases I, II and III.
b Assuming the marginal propensity to consume of interest income is less than one.
c Rigorously, these multiplier have no meaning for s = case II.TABLE 3
STATIC FISCAL MULTIPLIERS COMPARED
Endogenous variable Multipliers in the three cases considered
$* Y Case I   >   Case III   >   Case II
$* C Case I   >   Case III   >   Case II
$* P Case I   <   Case III   <   Case II
$
* m Case I   >   Case III   >   Case II (0)
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FIG. 1. ZERO PROFITS IN THE NON-TRADABLE GOOD SECTOR